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What Is Quantum Mechanics Trying to Tell Us?1
N. David Mermin
Laboratory of Atomic and Solid State Physics
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-2501
I explore whether it is possible to make sense of the quantum mechanical
description of physical reality by taking the proper subject of physics
to be correlation and only correlation, and by separating the problem
of understanding the nature of quantum mechanics from the hard prob-
lem of understanding the nature of objective probability in individual
systems, and the even harder problem of understanding the nature of
conscious awareness. The resulting perspective on quantum mechanics is
supported by some elementary but insufficiently emphasized theorems.
Whether or not it is adequate as a new Weltanschauung, this point of
view toward quantum mechanics provides a different perspective from
which to teach the subject or explain its peculiar character to people in
other fields.
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What Is Quantum Mechanics Trying to Tell Us?1
[W]e cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its connec-
tion with other things. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 2.0121
If everything that we call “being” and “non-being” consists in the ex-
istence and non-existence of connections between elements, it makes
no sense to speak of an element’s being (non-being). . . . Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, 50.
It happened to him as it always happens to those who turn to science
. . . simply to get an answer to an everyday question of life. Science
answered thousands of other very subtle and ingenious questions . . . but
not the one he was trying to solve. Tolstoy, Resurrection, XXX.
[I]n our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real
essence of the phenomena but only to track down, so far as it is possible,
relations between the manifold aspects of our experience. Bohr.2
I. What quantum mechanics is trying to tell us
I would like to describe an attitude toward quantum mechanics which, whether or not
it clarifies the interpretational problems that continue to plague the subject, at least sets
them in a rather different perspective. This point of view alters somewhat the language
used to address these issues — a glossary is provided in Appendix C — and it may offer
a less perplexing basis for teaching quantum mechanics or explaining it to non-specialists.
It is based on one fundamental insight, perhaps best introduced by an analogy.
My complete answer to the late 19th century question “what is electrodynamics trying
to tell us” would simply be this:
Fields in empty space have physical reality; the medium that supports
them does not.
Having thus removed the mystery from electrodynamics, let me immediately do the same
for quantum mechanics:
Correlations have physical reality; that which they correlate does not.
The first proposition probably sounded as bizarre to most late 19th century physicists as
the second sounds to us today; I expect that the second will sound as boringly obvious to
late 21st century physicists as the first sounds to us today.
And that’s all there is to it. The rest is commentary.
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II. Correlations and only correlations
Let me expand on my ten-word answer to what quantum mechanics is all about, which
I have called elsewhere3 the Ithaca interpretation of quantum mechanics (IIQM).
Note first that the term “physical reality” is not necessarily synonymous with unqual-
ified “reality”. The distinction is of no interest in understanding what classical electrody-
namics is trying to tell us, but it may be deeply relevant to why quantum mechanics has
not been widely seen to be a theory of correlation without correlata. I shall set aside for
now the tension between reality and physical reality , but as noted in Section IV below, it
will come back to force itself upon us.4
According to the IIQM the only proper subjects for the physics of a system are its
correlations. The physical reality of a system is entirely contained in (a) the correlations
among its subsystems and (b) its correlations with other systems, viewed together with
itself as subsystems of a larger system. I shall refer to these as the internal and exter-
nal correlations of the system. A completely isolated system is one that has no external
correlations or external dynamical interactions.
The wave function of a physical system (when it has one) or, more generally, its
quantum state (pure or mixed) is nothing more than a concise encapsulation of its internal
correlations. Insofar as the state or the wave function (when the state is pure) has physical
reality, that reality does not extend beyond the reality of the internal correlations that the
state encodes. In this respect the IIQM agrees with Bohr and Heisenberg, who viewed the
wave function as nothing more than a computational tool. It disagrees with Schro¨dinger’s
early view of the wave function, or with the views of currently active deviant subcultures,
such as the Bohm-de Broglie interpretation,5 and its recent refinements, or efforts to modify
quantum mechanics by making wave function “collapse” a dynamical physical process.6
The IIQM does not emerge from a general view of the world out of which quantum
mechanics is extracted; the strategy is rather to take the formalism of quantum mechanics
as given, and to try to infer from the theory itself what quantum mechanics is trying to tell
us about physical reality. Thus by systems and subsystems I simply mean the conventional
representation of a complex system by products of subsystem state spaces. If the system,
for example, is a Heisenberg model of a number of magnetic ions, the subsystems are
the spin degrees of freedom of the individual ions. If the system is a hydrogen atom, the
subsystems could be the electron and the proton, further resolved, if this is of interest, into
their spin and orbital degrees of freedom. In an example that preoccupied the founders of
the theory, the system is an experiment, and the subsystems are the microscopic object of
study and the macroscopic apparatus used to study it.
The crucial formal property of a resolution into subsystems is that all observables
associated with one subsystem must commute with all observables associated with any
other distinct subsystem. So if the subsystems are interacting, then we are dealing with
subsystem correlations at a given time. A further requirement is that that the subsystem
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subspaces whose product makes up the state space for the entire system can be straight-
forwardly identified in the standard way with physically meaningful subsystems of a real
(or model) physical system — i.e. that the resolution into subsystems is in some sense
natural, as it is in the above examples.7
By correlations among subsystems I have in mind the mean values, at any given time,
of all system observables (hermitian operators) that consist of products over subsystems of
individual subsystem observables. Among the observables of a subsystem are the projec-
tion operators onto its linear subspaces, so the set of all correlations among the subsystems
contains the set of all joint probability distributions over subsystems. Since these distri-
butions are in turn enough to determine the means of the products of all observables,
it does not matter whether one interprets “correlations” to mean joint distributions, or
means of products of observables. I shall use whichever interpretation is more appropriate
to the case at hand, but I should emphasize that I use the term “correlation” in a sense
in which the absence of correlation (arising when a joint distribution factors) is regarded
as correlation of a degenerate (trivial) form.
It is a remarkable (but not often remarked upon) feature of the quantum mechanical
formalism that all the joint distributions associated with any of the possible resolutions
of a system into subsystems and any of the possible choices of observable within each
subsystem, are mutually compatible: they all assign identical probabilities within any
sets of subsystems to which they can all be applied.8 The physical reality of subsystem
correlations need therefore not be restricted to any particular resolution of a system into
subsystems or to particular choices of observable within each subsystem, even though
different observables for a given subsystem fail, in general to commute. It is only when
one tries to go beyond their inter-subsystem correlations to actual correlata — particular
values for the subsystem observables — that non-commuting observables are incapable of
sharing simultaneous physical reality.9
The central conceptual difficulty for the IIQM is the puzzle of what it means to insist
that correlations and only correlations have physical reality. The “and only” part is an
inescapable consequence of many different “no-hidden-variables” theorems, as discussed
in Section IX below. These theorems require that if all correlations have simultaneous
physical reality, then all the correlated quantities themselves cannot. This problem — how
to make sense of correlations without correlata — brings us up against two major puzzles:
(1) How is probability to be understood as an intrinsic objective feature of the
physical world, rather than merely as a tactical device for coping with our igno-
rance? How is one to make sense of fundamental, irreducible correlation?
(2) Physics, at least as we understand it today, has nothing to say about the
phenomenon of consciousness. Conscious reality has more content than physical
reality.
I propose to set aside both of these puzzles. Many of the difficulties one encounters
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in interpreting quantum mechanics stem from our inadequate understanding of objective
probability and of conscious awareness. It seems worth inquiring whether one can make
sense of quantum mechanics conditional on eventually making sense of these two even more
difficult problems. I shall therefore take the notion of correlation as one of the primitive
building blocks from which an understanding of quantum mechanics is to be constructed.
And I shall take the extraordinary ability of consciousness to go beyond its own correlations
with certain other subsystems to a direct perception of its own underlying correlata as a
deep puzzle about the nature of consciousness, that ought not, however, to be a stumbling
block in constructing an understanding of the quantum mechanical description of the non-
conscious world.
Before moving to the effort to make sense of quantum mechanics, let me expand on
the two puzzles to be set aside.
III. The puzzle of objective probability.
If correlations constitute the full content of physical reality, then the fundamental role
probability plays in quantum mechanics has nothing to do with ignorance. The correlata
— those properties we would be ignorant of — have no physical reality. There is nothing
for us to be ignorant of.
A probability that deals only with correlation cannot be based on an ensemble of
copies of a given system, with properties having definite values in each copy, for the physical
absence of correlata applies separately to each copy. The only physical description it is
possible to give each individual member of such an ensemble, is in terms of its own internal
correlations. There is thus no physical or conceptual role for such an ensemble to play.
All its members are physically identical, each completely characterized by the identical
set of internal probabilities. The appropriate context for a theory of correlations without
correlata is one in which probabilistic notions have meaningful application to individual
systems.
It is entirely appropriate for a physics that is both fundamental and probabilistic to
apply directly to individual systems. The natural world, after all, consists of individual
systems; ensembles are an artificial contrivance or, at best, a very special kind of compos-
ite individual system. One motivation behind the desire for an ensemble interpretation
of quantum probabilities is a yearning (not always acknowledged) for hidden variables (of
which values for correlata constitute the most important example). The view that proba-
bilistic theories are about ensembles implicitly assumes that probability is about ignorance;
the hidden variables include whatever it is we are ignorant of. But in a non-deterministic
world, probability has nothing to do with incomplete knowledge. Quantum mechanics is
the first example in human experience where probabilities play an essential role even when
there is nothing to be ignorant about. The correlations quantum mechanics describes pre-
vail among quantities whose individual values are not just unknown: they have no physical
reality. We lack an adequate understanding of how probability or correlation is to be un-
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derstood under such conditions, but ensemble interpretations fail to capture this central
feature.
Another motivation for an ensemble interpretation of quantum probability is the intu-
ition that because the predictions of quantum mechanics are fundamentally probabilistic
rather than deterministic, quantum mechanics only can make sense as a theory of ensem-
bles. Whether or not this is the only way to understand probabilistic predictive power,
physics ought to be able to describe as well as predict the behavior of the natural world.
The fact that physics cannot make a deterministic prediction about an individual system
does not excuse us from pursuing the goal of being able to construct a description of
an individual system at the present moment, and not just a fictitious ensemble of such
systems.
I shall not explore further the notion of probability and correlation as objective prop-
erties of individual physical systems, though the validity of much of what I say depends
on subsequent efforts to make this less problematic. My instincts are that this is the right
order to proceed in: objective probability arises only in quantum mechanics. We will
understand it better only when we understand quantum mechanics better. My strategy
is to try to understand quantum mechanics contingent on an understanding of objective
probability, and only then to see what that understanding teaches us about objective
probability.10
So throughout this essay I shall treat correlation and probability as primitive concepts,
“incapable of further reduction . . . a primary fundamental notion of physics.”11 The aim
is to see whether all the mysteries of quantum mechanics can be reduced to this single
puzzle. I believe that they can, provided one steers clear of another even greater mystery:
the nature of ones own personal consciousness.
IV. The puzzle of consciousness.
Consciousness enters the picture through the disquieting but indisputable fact that I
know perfectly well that my individual particular perceptions of certain kinds of subsystems
do have a reality that goes beyond the correlation my perceptions have acquired with the
subsystem through my interaction with it. It has become traditional in this context to call
such subsystems classical or macroscopic. I know that that photomultiplier #1 fired and
photomultiplier #2 did not. I directly perceive the particularity of my conscious represen-
tation of the photomultipliers from which I infer the particularity of the photomultiplier
excitations themselves.
To the extent that “I” am describable by physics, which deals only with the cor-
relations between me and the photomultipliers, physics can only (correctly) assert that
photomultiplier #n firing is perfectly correlated with my knowing that photomultiplier
#n fired for either value of n. The question that physics does not answer is how it can
be that I know that it is #1 and is not #2. This is indeed a problem. It is part of the
problem of consciousness.
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The problem of consciousness is an even harder problem than the problem of inter-
preting quantum mechanics, and it is important not to confuse the two. As with the
puzzle of objective probability, here too it seems sensible to attempt first to understand
quantum mechanics in full awareness of the fact that we do not understand consciousness,
taking the view that consciousness is beyond the scope of physical science, at least as we
understand it today. This (and only this) is why I distinguish between reality and physical
reality . Physical reality is narrower than what is real to the conscious mind. Quantum
mechanics offers an insufficient basis for a theory of everything if everything is to include
consciousness.
Before relegating the problem of consciousness to the filing cabinet of harder problems
to be examined after satisfactorily interpreting quantum mechanics — we shall be forced
on various occasions in the pages that follow to acknowledge the existence of that cabinet
— let me note some manifestations even in classical physics of the ability of consciousness
to apprehend what physics cannot.
The notion of now — the present moment — is immediately evident to consciousness
as a special moment of time (or a brief interval — of order perhaps a few tenths of a
second). It seems highly plausible to me that your now overlaps with my now or, if you
are very far away from me, with a region space-like separated from my now . On the other
hand, I can conceive of it not working this way — that your now is two weeks behind or
fifteen minutes ahead of my now . In that case when we have a conversation each of us
is talking to a mindless hulk. I mention this not because I believe in mindless hulks but
because you encounter them in discussions of the “many worlds” interpretation of quantum
mechanics. I do not believe in many worlds any more than I believe in many nows, but
I find it significant that the imagery evoked in thinking about a purely classical puzzle
of consciousness is the same as that encountered in the many worlds attempt to extend
quantum mechanics to account for our conscious perceptions.12
Physics has nothing to do with such notions. It knows nothing of now and deals only
with correlations between one time and another. The point on my world-line corresponding
to now , obvious as it is to me, cannot be identified in any terms known to today’s physics.
This particularity of consciousness — its ability to go beyond time differences and position
itself absolutely along the world-line of the being that possesses it — has a similar flavor
to its ability to go beyond its own correlations with a subsystem, to a direct awareness
of its own particular correlatum and therefore, by inference, an awareness of a particular
subsystem property.13
An even simpler example of an elementary constituent of consciousness which physics
is silent on, is the quality of the sensation of blueness. Physics can speak of a certain
class of spectral densities of the radiation field, it can speak of the stimulation of certain
receptors within the eye, it can speak of nerve impulses from the eye to the visual cortex,
but it is absolutely silent about what is completely obvious to me (and I assume to you) —
the characteristic and absolutely unmistakable blue quality of the experience of blueness
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itself.14
Consciousness enters into the interpretation of quantum mechanics because it and it
alone underlies our conviction that a purely relational physics — a physics of correlations
without correlata — has insufficient descriptive power. Consciousness cannot easily be
banished from such discussions, because the conviction arises in contexts where the under-
lying conscious perception may only be implicit.15 One must therefore remain aware of its
ramifications, as a mystery in its own right, so one can disentangle the characteristic puz-
zles of consciousness from efforts to come to terms with the lesser puzzle of understanding
the quantum mechanical description of the non-conscious world.16
V. A Theorem about Quantum Correlations
There is a common-sense appeal to the idea of a physics that is mute on absolute
subsystem properties, restricted in its scope to the correlations among such properties.
Why should physics be able to produce more than a description of the world in the world’s
own terms, by relating some parts of the world to other parts? More substantially, it is
pertinent to note that I am on firm ground in insisting that the entire content of the physics
of a system consists of a specification of the correlations among its subsystems, because
this happens to be true. It is the content of an insufficiently noted but quite elementary
theorem, important enough to deserve a section of its own.
It is well known that if you are given the mean value of all the observables of a system,
then this uniquely determines its quantum state (pure or mixed). Suppose, however,
that the mean values you are supplied with are restricted to those of observables that
are products of subsystem observables over some specific resolution of the system into
subsystems — i.e. you are only supplied with the set of all correlations among a particular
set of subsystems that combine to make up the entire system. How well is the state of
the whole system pinned down when the set of specified mean values is restricted to such
products over subsystems of subsystem observables, excluding observables that extend
globally over the entire system?
The surprising (if you’ve never thought about it) answer is this: Completely! Sub-
system correlations (for any one resolution of the system into subsystems) are enough to
determine the state of the entire system uniquely. This theorem must have been noticed
early on, but the oldest statements of it that I know of are improbably recent.17 I shall
refer to it as the Theorem on the Sufficiency of Subsystem Correlations or SSC Theorem.
It follows immediately from three facts:
(1) As noted, the means of all observables for the entire system determine its
state.
(2) The set of all products over subsystems of subsystem observables contains a
basis for the algebra of all such system-wide observables.
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(3) The algorithm that supplies observables with their mean values is linear on
the algebra of observables.
As a result if you are given the mean values of all such product-over-subsystem observables,
it is a matter of simple arithmetic to compute the mean values of whatever set of global
system observables you need to pin down the state.
This is spelled out in detail in Appendix A. As a simple example, if a system consists
of two spin-1
2
subsystems, then the projection operator on the singlet state — the state of
zero total spin — is a global system observable. It has the well known form
Psinglet =
1
4
(
1− σ1x ⊗ σ2x − σ1y ⊗ σ2y − σ1z ⊗ σ2z
)
, (1)
and therefore its mean value is entirely determined by the mean values of the products of
the x-, y-, and z-components of the individual spins. Since the singlet state is that unique
state in which Psinglet has the mean value 1, the system will be in the singlet state provided
these three quantities all have the value −1 that expresses perfect anti-correlation.
That like components of the individual spins are perfectly anti-correlated in the sin-
glet state is a famously familiar fact; that perfect anti-correlations of three orthogonal
components is enough to ensure that the global state is the singlet state — a particularly
simple playing out of the possibility guaranteed by the SSC Theorem — is not as familiar.
Though the proof of the SSC Theorem is elementary, its conceptual implications are
profound. If the quantum theoretical description of the physical reality of a system is
complete, then so is the description of the system entirely in terms of all the correlations
that prevail among any specified set of its subsystems, because the information contained
in either of those two descriptions is the same. Anything you can say in terms of quantum
states — and some strange things can be stated in that language — can be translated into
a statement about subsystem correlations — i.e. about joint probability distributions. At
a minimum, whether or not the IIQM can be made into a coherent whole, this simple fact
ought to be stressed in all introductory expositions of the quantum theory:
The quantum state of a complex system is nothing more than a concise
encapsulation of the correlations among its subsystems.
The quantum state is a remarkably powerful encoding of those correlations. It en-
ables us to calculate them for any resolution of the system into subsystems and for any
set whatever of subsystem observables. The fact that all the different sets of subsystem
correlations can be encoded in a single quantum state provides an explicit demonstration
of the mutual consistency of the correlations associated with all of the different ways of
dividing a system into subsystems. While I am not convinced that this shift in point
of view from quantum state to subsystem correlations eliminates all conceptual problems
from the foundations of quantum mechanics, it does alter how you look at many of those
problems and, I believe, offers a better way to tell people encountering the subject for the
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first time what it is all about. In Sections VI-X I describe some of the shifts in perspective
that take place when you start taking seriously the notion that the physics of a system is
only about the correlations among its subsystems.
VI. Elimination of measurement from the foundations
The notion of “measurement” plays a fundamental role in conventional formulations of
quantum mechanics. Indeed quantum mechanics is often presented as merely an algorithm
that takes you from one measurement (“state preparation” involves selecting a particular
output channel from a measurement apparatus) to another. John Bell railed eloquently
against this.18 Why should the scope of physics be restricted to the artificial contrivances
we are forced to resort to in our efforts to probe the world? Why should a fundamental
theory have to take its meaning from a notion of “measurement” external to the theory
itself? Should not the meaning of “measurement” emerge from the theory, rather than the
other way around? Should not physics be able to make statements about the unmeasured,
unprepared world?
To restrict quantum mechanics to be exclusively about piddling labora-
tory operations is to betray the great enterprise. A serious formulation
will not exclude the big world outside of the laboratory.
I argue here that the very much broader concept of correlation ought to replace measure-
ment in a serious formulation of what quantum mechanics is all about.19
The key to freeing quantum mechanics from the tyranny of measurement is to note
that a measurement consists of the establishment of a particular kind of correlation between
two particular kinds of subsystems, and to insist that everything that can be said about the
physical reality of the correlations established in a measurement applies equally well to the
correlations among any subsystems of a quantum system. If physics is about correlations
among subsystems then it is a fortiori about measurement. But to insist that physics
is exclusively about measurement, is unnecessarily to relegate to an inferior ontological
status the more general correlations among arbitrary subsystems.
Expanding on this, let me review in its simplest form the standard characterization
of a measurement. In a measurement a particular interaction brings about a particular
kind of correlation between two particular subsystems. One of the subsystems, the one
one wishes to learn about, is arbitrary, but in many important applications it describes
something on the atomic scale. Call this subsystem the specimen. The other subsystem
has enormously many degrees of freedom, describing a piece of laboratory equipment that
includes some sort of readily readable output (which could be in the form of a pointer, a
digital display, or a print-out.) It is usually called the apparatus.
Initially, at the start of a measurement, the specimen and the apparatus are uncorre-
lated: the state of the specimen–apparatus system is a product state
|I〉 = |s〉 ⊗ |a〉. (2)
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To measure a specimen observable S with eigenstates |si〉 one must establish an interaction
between specimen and apparatus that takes an initial state |si〉 ⊗ |a〉 of the combined
system into the final state |si〉⊗|ai〉 where the |ai〉 are a set of orthogonal apparatus states
associated with macroscopically distinguishable scale readings:
|si〉 ⊗ |a〉 → |si〉 ⊗ |ai〉. (3)
Because the transformation (3) takes orthogonal states into orthogonal states it can indeed
be realized by a unitary transformation — i.e. as a time development under a suitable
choice of Hamiltonian. Because unitary transformations are linear, if the initial state of
the specimen has an expansion
|s〉 =
∑
αi|si〉, (4)
then when the measurement interaction has completed its action, the state of the system
will be
|F 〉 =
∑
αi|si〉 ⊗ |ai〉. (5)
A correlation has therefore been established between specimen and apparatus characterized
by the joint probability distribution
p(si, aj) = 〈F |PsiPaj |F 〉 = |αi|2δij (6)
(where the P ’s are the appropriate projection operators: Psi = |si〉〈si|, Pai = |ai〉〈ai|).
This joint distribution describes a perfect correlation between apparatus and specimen
states: the probability of the jth apparatus state being associated with the ith specimen
state is zero unless i = j. And the overall probability of the jth apparatus state is∑
i p(si, aj) = |αj |2, which is just the probability the Born rule assigns to “the result of a
measurement of S on a specimen in the state |s〉 yielding the value sj .”
So a measurement of a specimen observable S is an interaction between the specimen
and the apparatus designed to extend the Born probabilities from the specimen states |si〉
to corresponding apparatus states |ai〉. This is a useful thing to do because although we
humans are incapable of directly perceiving the condition of a microscopic specimen, we
are able to perceive the condition of a macroscopic apparatus. Both this ability of ours
and its limitation presumably arise from our having evolved under the selective pressure
of having to deal with macroscopic things like tigers and oranges, but not (at least at the
stage of development when consciousness first arose) with microscopic things like atoms and
molecules. As noted above, how we manage this conscious perception is deeply mysterious,
but it should be viewed as a mystery about us and should not be confused with the problem
of understanding quantum mechanics.
The great emphasis even today on the particular kinds of correlation established in
a measurement finds its origins in the early history of the subject. In the beginning,
when people were groping for an understanding of microscopic specimens, it was natural
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to express everything in terms of the more familiar macroscopic apparatuses with which
they were able to correlate the microscopic specimens, through measurement interactions.
Measurements produced the only correlations people felt comfortable with. Today, three
quarters of a century later, having accumulated a vast body of experience dealing with
microscopic specimens, we have developed enough intuition about them to contemplate
usefully a much broader class of correlations in which no subsystems are required to be of
the macroscopic or “classical” kind directly accessible to our perception, and in which the
correlations are neither necessarily of the one-to-one type established in a measurement
nor necessarily restricted to just a pair of subsystems.
The emphasis on measurement in conventional formulations of quantum mechanics,
and the accompanying emphasis on a classical domain of phenomena, ought to be viewed as
historic relics. The classical domain plays a central role only if one restricts the correlations
one is willing to call physically real, to those between specimens and apparatuses, where an
apparatus is a subsystem large enough that we can perceive it directly — i.e. a “classical”
subsystem. We ought by now to have outgrown this point of view. The bipartite specimen-
apparatus correlations produced by a measurement are not the only kinds of subsystem
correlations worthy of being granted physical reality. The quantum theory allows us to
contemplate together all the correlations among arbitrary subsystems, and it is simply a
bad habit not to grant micro-micro- · · · -micro correlations as much objective reality as the
traditional emphasis on measurements has granted to micro-macro correlations.
This reluctance to shift the emphasis from measurement to correlation lies behind
statements one often encounters to the effect that interactions with its environment are in
some not very well specified way continually measuring a specimen. This is to characterize
a very general state of affairs by a very special and rather atypical case. Interactions with
its environment have the precise effect of correlating a specimen with that environment.
Interactions with a measurement apparatus correlate a specimen with that apparatus. In
both cases interaction produces correlation. In measurements the interactions are designed
so that the correlations that develop have the particular form (6) of special interest to us. It
is only the reluctance to acknowledge that all correlations are real and objective — not just
those produced by a measurement — that leads one to view the more general specimen-
environment correlations in terms of the more special specimen-apparatus correlations
produced in a measurement.
VII. Elimination of knowledge from the foundations
There has always been talk to the effect that quantum mechanics describes not the
physical world but our knowledge of the physical world. This intrusion of human knowledge
into physics is distastefully anthropocentric. In the IIQM such talk is replaced with talk
about objective correlations between subsystems. Human knowledge has intruded for two
reasons:
(1) The restriction of attention to the correlations established in measurements has
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led to an excessively narrow focus on the correlations between a specimen and what we
know about it (or what our mechanical surrogate — the apparatus — records about it).
(2) There is a confusion between the strange and unprecedented role of probability
in the quantum theory as an objective feature of the physical world, and the older better
understood uses of probability as a practical device for coping with human ignorance.
Because we understand probability reasonably well in the latter sense, and have only a
glimmering of an understanding of probability in the more fundamental former sense, it
is tempting incorrectly to interpret probabilistic assertions as statements about human
ignorance or knowledge.
As an important illustration, consider how people distinguish between pure and mixed
states. It is often said that a system is in a pure state if we have maximum knowledge
of the system, while it is in a mixed state if our knowledge of the system is incomplete.
But from the point of view of the IIQM, we are simply a particular subsystem, and a
highly problematic one at that, to the extent that our consciousness comes into play. This
characterization of the difference between pure and mixed states can be translated into a
statement about objective correlation between subsystems, that makes no reference to us
or our knowledge:
By definition, a system S1 is in a pure state if all the correlations among any of its
own subsystems can be characterized in terms of a density matrix that is a projection
operator onto a one-dimensional subspace. This in turn can be shown (Appendix B) to
be possible if and only if any conceivable larger system S = S1 + S2 that contains S1 as a
subsystem has only trivial correlations (i.e. only factorizable joint distributions) between
its subsystems S1 and S2. Thus a system is in a pure state if and only if its internal
correlations are incompatible with the existence of any non-trivial external correlations.
The absence or presence of non-trivial external correlations is the objective fact. The
anthropocentrisms simply express the consequences of this fact for us, should we be told
all the internal correlations of S1. It is a another remarkable feature of quantum mechanics
(not shared with classical physics, where external correlations are always possible) that
the totality of all possible internal correlations is enough to determine whether or not any
non-trivial external correlations are possible. For Appendix A shows that the internal
correlations of a subsystem are enough to determine its density matrix; and Appendix B
shows that non-trivial external correlations are possible if and only if that density matrix
is not a one-dimensional projection operator. To characterize the situation in which the
internal correlations are of the kind that prohibit any external correlations as a situation
in which “we have maximum knowledge” is to let ourselves intrude on a formulation that
has no need of us.
This intrusion of “knowledge” into the distinction between pure and mixed states can
lead to another kind of confusion. It is a common error always to view a mixed state as
describing a system that is actually in one of a number of different possible pure states,
with specified probabilities. While this “ignorance interpretation” of the mixed state can
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indeed be a useful practical way to describe an ensemble of completely isolated systems,
it entirely misses the deep and fundamental character of mixed states: if a system has any
external correlations whatever, then its quantum state cannot be pure. Pure states are
a rarity, enjoyed only by completely isolated systems. The states of externally correlated
individual systems are fundamentally and irreducibly mixed. This has nothing to do with
“our ignorance”. It is a consequence of the existence of objective external correlation.
VIII. The Measurement Problem
According to a conventional view, if a specimen is in a state
|s〉 =
∑
αi|si〉, (7)
then after a measurement of an observable whose eigenstates are the |si〉, the state of
the system discontinuously “collapses” to the state |si〉 with probability |αi|2. At that
point all information contained in the phases of the amplitudes αi is irredeemably lost.
The “measurement problem” is the problem of how to reconcile this with the continuous
evolution of the specimen-apparatus system into the final state (5), which is clearly still
capable of revealing interference effects in the form of probabilities that do depend on the
phases of the αi.
According to the IIQM the state of a specimen is just a compact specification of all
its internal subsystem correlations. To understand collapse, we should restate it not in
terms of the state of the specimen, but in terms of the specimen’s internal correlations.
The physical content of the claim that after the measurement the system “is in” the state
|si〉 with probability |αi|2, is that after the measurement the specimen has the internal
correlations appropriate to the state |si〉 with probability |αi|2.
When it is put this way any discontinuity vanishes. For as noted above, during the
course of the measurement interaction the combined specimen-apparatus system evolves
continuously from its uncorrelated initial state (2) to the highly correlated final state (5).
As soon as any non-trivial correlation develops, the state of the specimen ceases to be
pure, and at the end of the interaction when the whole system is in the state (5), the state
of the specimen has continuously evolved into the mixed state
∑
|αi|2|si〉〈si|. (8)
In this mixed state the internal correlations of the specimen are identical to what they
would be if it were in the pure state |si〉 with probability |αi|2 — i.e. the internal correla-
tions are identical to those given by the collapse story.
This is another familiar tale. The IIQM shifts the way it is sometimes told, by
emphasizing that the state of a non-trivially correlated subsystem is never pure: the state
of the specimen evolves continuously from a pure state through a sequence of mixed states
into the “post-measurement” mixed state (8) at the moment the measurement interaction
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completes its task. If at that stage one wishes to regard the state of the specimen as
undergoing an abrupt change, it is at worst a collapse from a mixed state viewed in this
fundamental way, to the same mixed state viewed under the “ignorance interpretation”.
Since the internal correlations of the specimen are exactly the same regardless of which
view you take, the collapse, if one chooses so to regard it, is rather ethereal.
There is thus no quantum measurement problem for the internal correlations of the
specimen or the apparatus. After the measurement interaction is complete their states
are exactly — not just FAPP20 — the conventional post-measurement mixed states, which
reveal no interference effects whatever in any probability distributions associated entirely
with the specimen or entirely with the apparatus. These mixed states have evolved from
the pre-measurement pure states in an entirely continuous fashion.21
The measurement problem survives only in the specimen-apparatus correlations that
hold between specimen and apparatus observables, both of which differ from those char-
acterized by the joint distribution (6) that the measurement interaction was designed to
produce. Consider, for example, the specimen observable
S12 = |s1〉〈s2|+ |s2〉〈s1| (9)
and the apparatus observable
A12 = |a1〉〈a2|+ |a2〉〈a1|. (10)
In the final state (5) of the specimen-apparatus system these have nontrivial correlations
〈F |S12A12|F 〉 = 2Reα∗1α2 (11)
that depend on the relative phases of the αi, even though those phases can affect no
internal specimen or apparatus correlations in the state |F 〉.
There need be nothing peculiar about the specimen observable S12. If, for example,
the specimen is a two-state system viewed as a spin- 1
2
and |s1〉 and |s2〉 are the eigenstates
of the z-component of spin, then S12 is just the x-component. On the other hand the
apparatus observable A12 is quite bizarre, since its values ±1 discriminate between the ap-
paratus being in either of the two superpositions |a1〉± |a2〉 of states with macroscopically
distinguishable scale readings. “Macroscopically” is, of course, crucial. Were the “appara-
tus” merely another microscopic spin-12 , then (11) would give just the correlation in the two
x-components. Under those conditions there would be little trouble introducing a further
straightforward coupling between specimen and apparatus that undid the measurement
interaction, transforming the perfectly correlated system state with both subsystems in
mixed states back into the entirely uncorrelated system state with both subsystems back
in their initial pure states. For the same reasons that classical macroscopic systems are
hard to run backwards, the measurement interaction cannot so readily be undone when
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the apparatus is macroscopic. The apparatus observables whose correlation with the spec-
imen depend on the critical phases necessary for the reconstruction of the original state
are correspondingly difficult to realize.
But in principle it could be done. This is the measurement problem. What makes it
so much more vexing than the old classical problem of irreversibility at the macroscopic
level is only what happens when I get into the story. When I look at the scale of the
apparatus I know what it reads. Those absurdly delicate, hopelessly inaccessible, global
system correlations obviously vanish completely when they connect up with me. Whether
this is because consciousness is beyond the range of phenomena that quantum mechanics
is capable of dealing with, or because it has infinitely many degrees of freedom or spe-
cial super-selection rules of its own, I would not presume to guess. But this is a puzzle
about consciousness which should not get mixed up with efforts to understand quantum
mechanics as a theory of subsystem correlations in the non-conscious world.
It is here that the IIQM comes closest to the many-worlds extravaganza.22 Many
worlds (or many minds) enter the story only when the formalism is taken to apply to
consciousness itself. In that case, even though I know that photomultiplier #1 fired, this
correlation between me and the photomultipliers is associated with merely one component
of a superposition of states of the me-photomultipliers system. There is another compo-
nent in which I know that photomultiplier #2 fired. If quantum mechanics applies to
my conscious awareness (and if there is no objective physical process of “wave-function
collapse”) then there is no evading this, and away we go to Fairyland. But since there
are so many other aspects of conscious awareness that physics has nothing to say about, I
find it naive to assume that it can sensibly be extended to account for the characteristic
particularity of conscious experience that takes it beyond the correlations between me and
the objects of my knowledge.
If we leave conscious beings out of the picture and insist that physics is only about
correlation, then there is no measurement problem in quantum mechanics. This is not to
say that there is no problem. But it is not a problem for the science of quantum mechanics.
It is an everyday question of life: the puzzle of conscious awareness.
IX. Absence of Correlata
In maintaining that subsystem correlations and only correlations have physical reality,
I have not been very precise about what “and only” is meant to exclude. One thing that
it does not exclude is the existence of global probability distributions for an individual
subsystem, since these are special cases of its external correlations with the observables
for all the external subsystems taken to be identically unity. Indeed, as remarked upon
in Section II, it is a conceptually remarkable (though analytically trivial) feature of the
quantum mechanical formalism that every one of the many different joint distributions in
which a given subsystem S1 appears gives exactly the same set of marginal distributions
for that given subsystem. It does not matter which other subsystems S2, . . . ,Sn appear in
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the resolution S = S1 +S2 + · · ·+Sn of the full system S into subsystems, and it does not
matter which observable one choses for each of the other subsystems.
This is conceptually remarkable because if one takes the orthodox view that joint
distributions apply only to the results of measurement, then different joint distributions
leading to the same marginal distribution for S1 characterize mutually exclusive experi-
mental arrangements, and it is hard to understand why the marginal distributions for S1
should be invariant under such changes. I have remarked on this elsewhere.23 It is not
remarkable — on the contrary, it is essential for the consistency of the whole point of view
— if the joint distributions are regarded as characterizing coexisting aspects (all possible
subsystem correlations) of physical reality. The price one pays for this broader vision of
the nature of joint distributions is the need to deny physical reality to a complete collection
of correlata underlying all these correlations.
The correlata cannot all have physical reality because in spite of the existence of all
subsystem joint distributions and of unique marginal distributions for individual subsys-
tems, it is impossible to construct, in the standard way, a full and mutually consistent set
of conditional distributions from the joint and individual subsystem distributions. Let me
illustrate this extraordinary feature of quantum probabilities with what is probably the
simplest example of it, discovered by Lucien Hardy in a rather different context.24
Take a system consisting of two subsystems, each describable by a two-dimensional
state space. Consider just two non-commuting observables for each subsystem, named 1
and 2 for one subsystem, and 1′ and 2′ for the other. Label the two eigenstates of each
observable by the name of the observable and one of the two letters R (for “red”) or G
(for “green”), and consider the subsystem correlations in the system state
|Ψ〉 ∝ |2R, 2′R〉 − |1R, 1′R〉〈1R, 1′R|2R, 2′R〉 (12)
(where |X, Y 〉means |X〉⊗|Y 〉). According to the IIQM the 11′, 22′, 12′, and 21′ subsystem
correlations all have simultaneous physical reality and indeed, we can compute from (12)
the four joint distributions p(iX, j′Y ) where each of i and j can be 1 or 2, and each of X
and Y can be R or G.
Furthermore, the marginal distributions, characterizing one of the two systems,
p(iX) = p(iX, j′R) + p(iX, j′G) (13)
and
p(j′Y ) = p(iR, j′Y ) + p(iG, j′Y ) (14)
are indeed independent of whether the observable for the other (summed over) system is its
#1 or #2 observable. There is therefore no formal obstacle to defining in the conventional
way conditional distributions satisfying
p(iX |j′Y )p(j′Y ) = p(iX, j′Y ) (15)
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and
p(j′Y |iX)p(iX) = p(iX, j′Y ). (16)
Yet these conditional distributions are mutually inconsistent.
The proof of this for the Hardy state (12) is simple. Inspection of (12) reveals that |Ψ〉
is constructed to be orthogonal to the state |1R, 1′R〉, and it is also orthogonal to the states
|1G, 2′G〉, and |2G, 1′G〉, since the R and G eigenstates of any one subsystem observable
are orthogonal. But |Ψ〉 is not orthogonal to |2G, 2′G〉, since for either subsystem the
eigenstates of the #2 observable are neither orthogonal to nor identical to those of the
#1 observable. Consequently the probabilities p(1R, 1′R), p(1G, 2′G), and p(2G, 1′G) are
zero, but p(2G, 2′G) is not:
p(1G, 2′G) = p(1R, 1′R) = p(2G, 1′G) = 0,
p(2G, 2′G) 6= 0. (17)
The vanishing of p(1G, 2′G) requires that
p(1R|2′G) = 1, (18)
the vanishing of p(1R, 1′R) requires that
p(1′G|1R) = 1, (19)
and the vanishing of p(2G, 1′G) requires that
p(2R|1′G) = 1. (20)
Combining these, if observable 2′ has the value G, then (18) requires 1 to have the value
R, in which case (19) requires 1′ to have the value G, in which case (20) requires 2 to have
the value R. So if 2′ has the value G then 2 must have the value R:
p(2R|2′G) = 1. (21)
But this is inconsistent with the non-zero value of p(2G, 2′G). The statistics (17) are
incompatible with these straightforwardly constructed conditional distributions.
The conventional interpretation of quantum mechanics finds the above line of reason-
ing unacceptable. According to the conventional view, probabilities like p(iX, j′Y ) are not
measures of some pre-existing set of objective correlations between all four pairs of sub-
system observables. These probabilities apply only to the results of actual measurements.
The probability p(1R, 2′G) is the probability that a joint measurement of observables 1 and
2′ yields the values R and G. The three conditional distributions (18)-(20) do not charac-
terize coexisting states of being, but the results of mutually exclusive experiments. Since
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at most one of the experiments can actually be performed, at most one of the distributions
is meaningful, and it makes no sense to combine them as I have done.
But the IIQM takes a broader view of joint distributions. All correlations among
all possible subsystem observables have simultaneous physical reality. In particular all
four pair distributions have physical reality, whether or not one chooses to extend the
correlations between a particular one of these pairs to a pair of apparatuses by means of
an appropriately chosen measurement interaction. What the preceding argument demon-
strates is that if all the subsystem joint distributions do share a common physical reality,
then the conditional distributions constructed from them cannot, even though all the joint
distributions yield unique mutually consistent marginal distributions for the subsystems.
But if it makes no physical sense to talk about the probability of 1 being R, given that
2′ is G, this can only be because absolute subsystem properties are not “given”. If phys-
ical reality consists of all the correlations among subsystems then physical reality cannot
extend to the values for the full set of correlata underlying those correlations.
The way we conventionally speak of probability makes it hard to express this state of
affairs. One tends, for example, to speak of p(1R, 2′G) as the probability that 1 is R and
2′ is G. But if it makes sense to speak of 1 being R and 2′ being G, why should it not make
equal sense to speak of the probability of 1 being R, given that 2′ is G? The answer has
to be that p(1R, 2′G) cannot be viewed as the probability that 1 is R and 2′ is G. This
would make sense were probability a device for coping with ignorance, but the objective
probabilities of quantum mechanics exist even though there is nothing to be ignorant of.
They express correlations in the absence of correlata. To avoid such linguistic traps it
would be better to speaking not of “probabilities” but of “propensities” or “dispositions”,
or to eschew all talk of probability in favor of talk about correlation.
I am not suggesting that banishing “probability” from our vocabulary will remove all
puzzles from quantum mechanics; only that it can help avoid misuses of that term. As
noted in Section III, the problem of what objective probability or objective correlation
or propensity might mean — of what it means to have correlation when values cannot
be assigned to the correlata — is one I propose to set aside to explore whether one can
make better sense of quantum mechanics, contingent on acquiring a better understanding
of this admittedly peculiar notion. What Hardy’s state (12) tells us is that if all corre-
lations between subsystems do have joint physical reality, then distributions conditional
on particular subsystem properties cannot in general exist, and therefore such correlations
must be without correlata.25
X. Nonlocality?
Hardy did not come up with the state (12) to demonstrate that the joint existence
of pair distributions is incompatible with the joint existence of conditional distributions.
He produced it as a succinct and powerful contribution to the tradition of “nonlocality”
arguments stemming from Bell’s theorem.26
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Under the IIQM, such arguments do not work as demonstrations of nonlocality. If two
subsystems are spatially separated then the local properties of each are limited to their
internal correlations. These are completely determined by the density matrix of each.
The density matrix of either subsystem is unaffected by any dynamical process acting only
on the other subsystem, even when the dynamical process consists of letting the other
subsystem undergo a measurement interaction with a third subsystem that functions as an
apparatus. The choice and performance of a measurement on one subsystem cannot alter
the local properties of the other, far away subsystem. Otherwise one could use “quantum
nonlocality” to send instantaneous signals. The impossibility of doing this should be called
physical locality .
Quantum mechanics obeys physical locality. “Quantum nonlocality” (a violation, so
to speak, of metaphysical locality) arises when one tries to reconcile the actual results of
specific experiments to the hypothetical results of other experiments that might have been
performed but were not. In talking of “actual results” one is going beyond the subsystem
correlations with which physics can deal, to our mysterious ability to perceive — i.e.
become consciously aware of — a particular one of the correlated possibilities, when we
ourselves are among the subsystems. While it is surely unreasonable to insist that we have
no right to try to make sense of our own direct perceptions, this kind of reasoning goes
beyond what can be expressed in proper physical terms. Pearle.
Nevertheless, the following line of thought has a powerful appeal. Consider a series of
experiments in which two particles interact in such a way as to leave them in the Hardy
state, and then fly apart to separate measurement apparatuses in a manner that preserves
the Hardy state correlations of all the #1 and #2 observables. This is possible if those
observables are, for example polarizations along different non-orthogonal directions.
Consider a series of measurements in which the choice of which observable to measure
is decided by tossing a coin at the site of the measurement. Consider a run in which
the coin tosses result in observables 2 and 2′ being measured, and in which the result of
each measurement is perceived to be G. (The non-vanishing of p(2G, 2′G) guarantees that
such runs are possible.) Suppose the measurement interactions take place in space-like
separated space-time regions, so there is a frame of reference (Alice’s — let her be in the
vicinity of the unprimed measurement as it takes place) in which the perception of G at
the unprimed system occurs before the toss of the coin at the primed system, and another
frame (Bob’s — let him be in the space-time neighborhood of the primed measurement)
in which G is perceived at the primed system before the toss at the unprimed system.
Once Alice perceives G for the 2-measurement, she is surely entitled to conclude that
if the (yet to be performed in her frame) coin toss results in a 1′-measurement on the
primed system, the result will be perceived to be R, since p(2G, 1′G) = 0. By the same
token once Bob perceives G for the 2′ measurement he can correctly conclude that if the
(still unperformed in his frame) toss at the unprimed system results in a 1 measurement
the perceived result must be R.
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How can these two valid conclusions be reconciled with the fact that 1R and 1′R
are never jointly perceived? There are two options. The first is to abandon the implicit
assumption that the perceived result of a later measurement is unaffected by the choice
and/or outcome of an earlier one. This is a route taken by those who embrace quantum
nonlocality. It has the disconcerting feature that which measurement process affects which
depends on whether you are using Alice’s frame of reference or Bob’s, but since the influence
is of one of two space-like separated events on another, this is unavoidable. The most
determined efforts to extract nonlocality from this kind of reasoning are those of Henry
Stapp,27
The second option (which I prefer) is to deny that the combined predictions of Alice
and Bob have any relevance to what would have been perceived if both measurements had
actually been of type 1. Indeed, it is hard to give “what would have been perceived”
any meaning in this case, since both predictions are based on actual perceptions of type-
2 measurements. Alice, for example, having perceived G in her type-2 measurement is
perfectly correct in concluding that if the toss of Bob’s coin results in a 1′ measurement
then Bob will necessarily perceive R. Similarly for Bob. But to extract from this a
contradiction with the impossibility of joint 1R and 1′R perceptions, it is necessary to slide
from statements about actual perceived results of actual experiments to possible perceived
results of experiments that were not actually performed. This is to extend the peculiar but
undeniable ability of consciousness to experience the particularity of a correlation in an
actual individual case to a hypothetical ability to experience the fictional particularity of
a correlation in a fictional case, and to impose a consistency on the actually and fictionally
perceived particularities.
It is hard to see how to make this compelling, unless what consciousness is directly
perceiving are actual correlata underlying all the correlations. If these had physical real-
ity in an individual case, locality would indeed require the value of a correlatum in one
subsystem to be the same, regardless of what local operations were performed on the
other subsystem. But since quantum mechanics is about correlations that exist without
correlata, such an argument does not work as a demonstration of nonlocality.28
There is another tradition of nonlocality arguments, starting with the very first version
of Bell’s theorem which tests whether all the correlations between currently non-interacting
and far-apart subsystems can be explained in terms of information commonly available to
the subsystems at the time of their last interaction. This “common-cause” explanation for
correlation assumes that it makes sense to condition all joint subsystem distributions on
the detailed features of such hypothetical common information. One then imposes some
reasonable locality conditions on these hypothetical conditional distributions and shows
that the resulting forms imply certain inequalities that are inconsistent with the joint
distributions given by quantum mechanics.
From the perspective of the IIQM, if the pair of systems is completely isolated from
the rest of the world, such a conditioning on common information is highly problematic,
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independent of the subsequent imposing of locality conditions on such conditional distribu-
tions. Refining the subsystem joint distributions according to “conditions” at the source,
makes little sense from the perspective of the SSC Theorem, which assures us that the cor-
relations contain in themselves complete information about the physical reality (encoded
in the state) of the two-subsystem system. Such a refinement would grant physical reality
to further features of the correlations going beyond what is contained in their joint (pure)
state. The only thing such arguments show to be nonlocal is any such supplementation of
the quantum mechanical description. Indeed, that was how Bell put it in his first paper,
and for some time thereafter the theorem was viewed not as a proof that the physical world
is nonlocal, but only as a nonlocality proof for any hidden variables theory underlying the
correlations.
It is, to be sure, a remarkable fact that the common-cause explanation for correlation
between non-interacting subsystems fails when applied to quantum correlations, but this
ought to be understood in terms of the broader (equally remarkable) fact that correlation
and only correlation constitutes the full content of physical reality.
XI. Comments on other approaches.
I first encountered the view that correlations are fundamental and irreducible when
I heard it advocated as the proper way to think about Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR)
correlations, in talks by Paul Teller29 and Arthur Fine.30 It did not then occur to me that
this might be the proper way to think about much more general correlations, but it should
have, since this is an important part of Bohr’s reply31 to EPR.32 Nor did it occur to me
that objective reality might consist only of correlations until I heard Lee Smolin33 sketch
an approach to quantum mechanics that treated symmetrically a physical system and the
world external to that physical system. Shortly thereafter I received a beautiful paper
from Carlo Rovelli34 arguing from a very different point of view that quantum states
were expressions of relations between subsystems. Recently Gyula Bene35 has written
interestingly along these lines.
This general attitude towards quantum states — that the information they contain is
necessarily relational —goes at least back to Everett’s original “relative–state” formulation
of quantum mechanics.36 What is special to the IIQM is (a) its insistence, justified by the
SSC Theorem, on replacing all talk about quantum states with talk about subsystem
correlations, (b) its insistence that all correlations among subsystem observables for all
resolutions into subsystems have joint validity — simultaneous physical reality, if you will,
and (c) its insistence that the correlata that underly those correlations lie beyond the
descriptive powers of physical science or, equivalently, that although all subsystem joint
distributions are meaningful the corresponding conditional distributions are not.
The IIQM evokes the Everett interpretation in stressing that a measurement is nothing
more than a particular kind of interaction between two particular types of subsystems,
designed to yield a particular kind of correlation, and in stressing the fact that a system
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S1 that has non-trivial external correlations with a system S2, has no pure state of its
own, even when the joint system S = S1 + S2 is in a pure state |Ψ〉. The IIQM assigns
a fundamental status to the reduced density matrix of S1 as the complete embodiment of
all its internal correlations. Everett, on the other hand, characterizes S1 by a multitude of
pure states, each conditional on the assignment of an (almost arbitrary) pure state to S2.
Specifically, if
P = |χ〉〈χ| (22)
is a projection operator on any pure state |χ〉 of S2 and
〈Ψ|P |Ψ〉 6= 0, (23)
then one easily establishes that there is a unique pure state |φ〉 of S1 for which the mean
value of any observable A of S1 is given by
〈φ|A|φ〉 = 〈Ψ|AP |Ψ〉/〈Ψ|P |Ψ〉. (24)
Everett calls |φ〉 the state of S1 relative to |χ〉 being the state of S2.
According to the IIQM Everett’s relative states have no physical significance, because
the internal correlations of the subsystem S1 in the relative state |φ〉 are given by a dis-
tribution that is conditioned on the other subsystem S2 being in the state |χ〉. While the
correlations between arbitrary observables of S1 and the observable P = |χ〉〈χ| of S2, or
the corresponding joint distributions, do have physical reality, the conditional distribution
for S1 obtained by conditioning on P having the value 1 in S2 does not. As discussed in
Section IX, one cannot condition on the values of correlata, because such values have no
physical reality. Thus Everett’s relative states of a subsystem give rise to internal cor-
relations for that subsystem that are specified by conditional distributions that have no
physical meaning in the IIQM. It is the insistence on the simultaneous reality of all these
conditional distributions that sends one off into the cloud-cuckoo-land of many worlds.
Christopher Fuchs has suggested37 that the distinction between the many worlds inter-
pretation and the “correlations without correlata” of the IIQM, is most succinctly expressed
by characterizing many worlds as correlata without correlations. In the many worlds inter-
pretation particular individual values of physical properties exist in (over)abundance; but
the problem of relating probabilities to the branching of the worlds of different correlata
has not been satisfactorily resolved, in spite of many efforts going all the way back to
Everett’s original paper.
There has also been a venerable tradition of talk about consciousness and quantum
physics, almost from the beginning. My own talk is closest to that which gives conscious-
ness the power of ultimately “reducing the wave packet.” The difference is that the IIQM
does not speak of wave packet reduction at all, because if physical reality consists only of
correlations, nothing physically real ever changes discontinuously. To be sure a vestige of
this point of view is retained in my warnings to separate the problem of our mysterious
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ability directly to perceive the particularity of our own correlation with another macro-
scopic system from the problem of understanding quantum mechanics. But as noted in
Section IV, the IIQM takes the view that this ability poses a very hard problem about the
nature of our consciousness which ought not to be confused with the merely hard prob-
lem of understanding the nature of quantum mechanics as applied to a world devoid of
consciousness.38
This point of view toward consciousness is in sharp contrast to a more recent tradition,
which tries to find an explanation for consciousness based on quantum physics.39 The IIQM
takes quite the opposite position, that consciousness experience goes beyond anything
physics is currently (and perhaps ever) capable of coming to grips with.
Two other interpretive schemes — the modal interpretations40 and the consistent his-
tories approach41 — also dethrone measurement. Both can be distinguished from the
approach described here in terms of how they treat correlations and correlata. Modal
interpretations grant reality to more than just relational quantities, at the price of re-
stricting this stronger reality to very special circumstances. Subsystem correlations and
the associated correlata can be real provided there are just two subsystems, and provided
the correlations have the strong form (6). This is made interesting by the Schmidt (polar)
decomposition theorem,42 which guarantees that the state of any two-subsystem system
leads to such correlations for some choice of the two subsystem observables. But it leaves
the status of other observables up in the air, is embarrassed when the Schmidt decomposi-
tion of the two subsystem state is not unique, and has nothing to say about three or more
subsystems.
The consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics applies to time-depend-
ent as well as equal-time correlations. In contrast to the IIQM, consistent historians are
not at œ[Ball shy about dealing with the correlata that underly a given set of correlations.
They gain this interpretive flexibility by insisting that any talk about either correlations
or correlata must be restricted to sets of observables singled out by certain quite stringent
consistency conditions. Thus in the example of Section VII consistent historians may speak
of the correlations and the correlata for the observables 1 and 1′ or those for 1 and 2′ or
those for 2 and 1′ or those for 2 and 2′. But they are forbidden to combine features of all
these cases into a single description. These various incompatible descriptions constitute
mutually exclusive “frameworks” for describing a single physical system.
I view the consistent histories interpretation as a formalization and extension of Bohr’s
doctrine of complementarity.43 The consistent historians liberate complementarity from
the context of mutually exclusive experimental arrangements, by stating the restrictions
in terms of the quantum mechanical formalism itself, without any reference to measure-
ment. This enables one within a given framework to contemplate what is whether or not
anything has actually been measured — indeed measurements in the consistent histories
interpretation (as in the IIQM and the Everett interpretation) are simply a special case in
which some of the subsystems function as apparatuses.
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The price one pays for this liberation is that the paradoxical quality of complemen-
tarity is stripped of the protective covering furnished by Bohr’s talk of mutually exclusive
experimental arrangements, and laid bare as a vision of a single reality about which one
can reason in a variety of mutually exclusive ways, provided one takes care not to mix
them up. Reality is, as it were, replaced by a set of complementary representations, each
including a subset of the correlations and their accompanying correlata. In the consistent
histories interpretation it is rather as if the representations have physical reality but the
representata do not.
The IIQM, in contrast, allows one to contemplate together all subsystem correlations,
associated with all complementary sets of subsystem observables. In justification of treat-
ing all such correlations as simultaneously real one notes that quantum mechanics allows
one, given the state of the global system, to calculate together the values of all such corre-
lations; that the joint (but not the conditional) distributions arrived at in this way are all
mutually consistent; and that quantum mechanics insures that the catalog of all such joint
subsystem distributions completely pins down the global state. The IIQM achieves this
capability by denying to physics the possibility of dealing with the individual correlata at
all.
Whether this is a fatal defect of the IIQM, whether it is a manifestation of the primitive
state of our thinking about objective probability, or whether it is a consequence of the
inability of physics to encompass conscious awareness, remains to be explored.
XII. A few final remarks
At the risk of losing the interest of those who (like myself) read only the first and last
Sections before deciding whether the rest is worth perusing, I conclude with some brief
comments about loose ends.
As noted at the beginning, what I have been describing is more an attitude toward
quantum mechanics than a systematic interpretation. The only proper subject of physics
is how some parts of the world relate to other parts. Correlations constitute its entire
content. The actual specific values of the correlated quantities in the actual specific world
we know, are beyond the powers of physics to articulate. The answer to the question “What
has physical reality?” depends on the nature of “what”. The answer is “Everything!” if
one is asking about correlations among subsystems, but “Nothing!” if one is asking about
particular values for the subsystem correlata.
This alters the terms of the traditional debates. Traditionally people have been asking
what correlata have physical reality. The many different schools of thought differ by
answering with many different versions of “Some” while the IIQM answers “None!” The
question of what correlations have physical reality, which the IIQM answers with “All!”
has not, to my knowledge, been asked in this context. While I maintain that abandoning
the ability of physics to speak of correlata is a small price to pay for the recognition that
it can speak simultaneously and consistently of all possible correlations, there remains the
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question of how to tie this wonderful structure of relationships down to anything particular,
if physics admits of nothing particular.
At this stage I am not prepared to offer an answer, beyond noting that this formulates
the conceptual problem posed by quantum mechanics in a somewhat different way, and
suggesting that there may be something to be learned by thinking about it along these
lines. I suspect our unfathomable conscious perceptions will have to enter the picture,
as a way of updating the correlations. To acknowledge this is not to acknowledge that
“consciousness collapses the wave-packet”. But it is to admit that quantum mechanics does
not describe a world of eternally developing correlation (described by “the wave-function
of the universe”), but a phenomenology for investigating what kinds of correlations can
coexist with each other, and for updating current correlations and extrapolating them into
the future. This phenomenology applies to any system that can be well approximated as
completely isolated.
A skeptic might object that the problem of how to update correlations is nothing more
than the measurement problem, under a new name. Perhaps it is, but at least the problem
is posed in a new context: how are we to understand the interplay between correlation as
the only objective feature of physical reality and the absolute particularity of conscious
reality? Is something missing from a description of nature whose purpose is not to disclose
the real essence of the phenomena but only to track down relations between the manifold
aspects of our experience? Is this a shortcoming of our description of nature or is it a deep
problem about the nature of our experience?
Besides “measurement” John Bell44 also disapproved of the word “system” — a word I
have used uncritically more than a hundred times (not counting “subsystem”, which occurs
even more often). If the purpose of physics is to track down relations between the manifold
aspects of our experience, then there is nothing wrong in leaving the specifications of the
systems to us ourselves, however we manage to do it — sometimes by direct conscious
perception, sometimes by deductions from what we have learned from the correlations we
have managed to induce between the systems we can perceive and the ones we cannot.
Admitting “system” to the proper vocabulary of physics is not the same as admitting
“correlata” — the (physically inacessible) particular values of the quantifiable properties
of an individual system.
By acknowledging that in our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the
real essence of the phenomena, we free ourselves to construct from the manifold aspects
of our experience formal representations of the systems we want to talk about. We have
learned how to express their possible correlations by an appropriate state space, and the
evolution of those correlations by an appropriate Hamiltonian. By setting aside “the real
essence of the phenomena” we also acquire the ability to replace the befuddling spectre
of an endlessly branching state of the universe — as disturbing in the self-styled down-
to-earth Bohmian interpretation as it is in the wildest extravagances of the many worlds
interpretation — with a quantum mechanics that simply tells us how we can expect some
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of the manifold aspects of our experience to be correlated with others. While this may
sound anthropocentric, it is my expectation that anthropos can be kept out of everything
but the initial and final conditions, and often (but not always) even out of those.
But this remains to be explored.
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Appendix A. The SSC Theorem: Subsystem correlations determine the state
Given a system S = S1+S2 with density matrixW , then W is completely determined
by the values of trW A⊗B for an appropriate set of observable pairs A, B, where A = A⊗1
is an observable of subsystem S1 and B = 1 ⊗ B is an observable of subsystem S2. The
proof is straightforward:
Give the state spaces for S1 and S2 orthonormal bases of states |ψµ〉 and |φα〉, respec-
tively. Let the A’s consist of the hermitian operators on S1
A(µν)r =
1
2
(|ψµ〉〈ψν |+ |ψν〉〈ψµ|
)
(25)
and
A
(µν)
i =
1
2i
(|ψµ〉〈ψν | − |ψν〉〈ψµ|
)
, (26)
and let the B’s consist of the hermitian operators on S2
B(αβ)r =
1
2
(|φα〉〈φβ |+ |φβ〉〈φα|
)
(27)
and
B
(αβ)
i =
1
2i
(|φα〉〈φβ| − |φβ〉〈φα|
)
. (28)
The states |ψµ, φα〉 = |ψµ〉 ⊗ |φα〉 are a complete orthonormal set of states for the
composite system S, and the density matrix W for the entire system S is determined by
its matrix elements
〈ψν , φβ|W |ψµ, φα〉 = TrW
(|ψµ, φα〉〈ψν , φβ |
)
. (29)
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But this can be expressed entirely in terms of quantities of the form TrW (A ⊗ B) — i.e.
in terms of subsystem correlations:
〈ψν , φβ|W |ψµ, φα〉 =
TrW
(|ψµ, φα〉〈ψν, φβ |
)
= TrW
((
A(µν)r + iA
(µν)
i
)⊗ (B(αβ)r + iB(αβ)i
))
=
TrW
(
A(µν)r ⊗B(αβ)r
)− TrW (A(µν)i ⊗B(αβ)i
)
+iTrW
(
A(µν)r ⊗B(αβ)i
)
+ iTrW
(
A
(µν)
i ⊗B(αβ)r
)
. (30)
Thus the values of the subsystem correlations between all the A’s and B’s are enough to
determine all the matrix elements of W in a complete set of states for the total system S,
and hence they are enough to determine the density matrix W for the total system.
This proof straightforwardly generalizes to a system S = S1 + · · ·+ Sn composed of
more than two subsystems: given any resolution of S into n subsystems, the density matrix
of S is entirely determined by the correlations among appropriate observables belonging
to those subsystems. In such cases the structure of quantum mechanics guarantees the
important fact that it doesn’t matter whether we pin down the density matrix, for example,
of S = S1 +S2 + S3 from correlations between observables of S1 with observables that act
globally on S2+S3, or from correlations between observables of S3 with observables acting
globally on S1 + S2, or from tripartite correlations among observables acting only on the
three subsystems.
Thus the density matrix of a composite system determines all the correlations among
the subsystems that make it up and, conversely, the correlations among all the subsystems
completely determine the density matrix for the composite system they make up. The
mathematical structure of quantum mechanics imposes constraints, of course, on what
those correlations can be — namely they are restricted to those that can arise from some
global density matrix. The particular form of that density matrix is then completely pinned
down by the correlations themselves.
That the correlations cannot be more general than that is the content of Gleason’s
Theorem.45 It would be interesting to explore the extent to which the underlying structure
of probabilities assigned to subspaces of a Hilbert space on which Gleason’s Theorem
rests is itself pinned down by the requirement of consistency among the different possible
resolutions of a system into subsystems.
Appendix B. The external correlations of a system
are necessarily trivial if and only if its state is pure
We first show that if the state of a subsystem S1 is pure, i.e. if its density matrix W1
is a one-dimensional projection operator,
W1 = Pφ = |φ〉〈φ|, (31)
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then the density matrix W of any larger system system S = S1 + S2 containing S1 as a
subsystem must be of the form
W = Pφ ⊗W2, (32)
and therefore all external correlations of S1 are trivial.
This is easily established in the representation in which W is diagonal:
W =
∑
i
wi|Ψi〉〈Ψi|, (33)
where the weights wi are non-negative. If the reduced density matrix W1 for S1 has the
form (31), then its diagonal elements 〈φ′|W1|φ′〉 must vanish for any state |φ′〉 in the state
space of S1 orthogonal to |φ〉; i.e. if the |χn〉 are any orthonormal basis for the state space
of S2, then
0 =
∑
n
〈φ′, χn|W |φ′, χn〉 =
∑
i,n
wi|〈φ′, χn|Ψi〉|2. (34)
Since the wi are non-negative, for every non-zero wi we have
0 = 〈φ′, χn|Ψi〉. (35)
Now if the |φj〉 are an orthonormal basis for the state space of S1 with |φ1〉 = |φ〉, then
each |Ψi〉 appearing in the expansion (33) of W is of the form
|Ψi〉 =
∑
j,n
|φj , χn〉〈φj , χn|Ψi〉 (36)
It follows from (35) that
|Ψi〉 =
∑
n
|φ, χn〉〈φ, χn|Ψi〉 = |φ〉 ⊗
∑
n
|χn〉〈φ, χn|Ψi〉. (37)
This (with the form (33) of W ) shows that W is indeed of the form (32).
Conversely, if the state of S1 is mixed, then its density matrix has the form
W1 =
∑
pi|φi〉〈φi| (38)
where the states |φi〉 are orthonormal and at least two of the pi (which we can take to
be p1 and p2) are non-zero. This density matrix can arise if S1 is a subsystem of a larger
system S = S1 + S2 with pure-state density matrix
W = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| (39),
where the state |Ψ〉 is given by
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
√
pi|φi〉 ⊗ |χi〉, (40)
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and the |χi〉 are an orthonormal set of states for S2. If observables A1 and A2 are defined
for each subsystem by
A1 = |φ1〉〈φ2|+ |φ2〉〈φ1| (41)
and
A2 = |χ1〉〈χ2|+ |χ2〉〈χ1| (42)
then A1 and A2 are non-trivially correlated, since
TrWA1 ⊗ A2 = 2√p1p2 (43)
but
TrWA1 ⊗ 1 = 0; TrW 1⊗ A2 = 0. (44)
Appendix C. Glossary of terms
Internal correlations. The internal correlations of a system are the correlations prevailing
among any of its subsystems.
External correlations. The external correlations of a system are those it has with other
systems which together constitute the subsystems of a larger system.
Trivial correlations. Subsystem correlations arising from joint probabilities that are prod-
ucts of subsystem probabilities.
Non-trivial correlations. Correlations that are not trivial — i.e. in which the mean of some
products differs from the product of the means.
State. The state of a system is the complete set of all its internal correlations. These are
concisely encoded in its density matrix.
SSC Theorem. The theorem on the sufficiency of subsystem correlations for a complete
determination of the quantum state of a composite system. It is stated and proved in
Appendix A; see also Ref. 17.
Pure state. The state of a system whose density matrix is a one-dimensional projection
operator. Or, equivalently, the state of a system that has no nontrivial external correla-
tions.
Mixed state. The state of a system whose density matrix is not a one-dimensional pro-
jection operator. Or, equivalently, the state of a system that can have nontrivial external
correlations.
Dynamically isolated system. A system that has no external interactions.
Completely isolated system. A system that has no external interactions or correlations.
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Specimen. A subsystem (usually microscopic) that we wish to learn something about.
Apparatus. A macroscopic subsystem we dynamically correlate with a specimen.
Measurement. The dynamical process by which the correlations between a specimen and
an apparatus are brought into the particular canonical form (6).
Physical locality. The fact that the internal correlations of a dynamically isolated system
do not depend on any interactions experienced by other systems external to it.
Metaphysical locality. The requirement (often violated) that the external correlations of a
dynamically isolated system should make sense in terms of internal correlata.
Correlatum. The particular value of a property of an individual system (represented in the
formalism by a particular eigenvalue of the corresponding hermitian operator). According
to the IIQM correlations among the correlata of different subsystems have physical reality
but the correlata themselves do not.
Physical reality. That whereof physics can speak. For example the physical reality of
blue includes a certain class of Fourier decompositions of the radiation field, and the
excitations in the retina produced by fields with such Fourier decompositions, and the
signals transmitted by such excitations to the visual cortex.
Reality. Physical reality plus that on which physics is silent, its conscious perception.
For example for me the reality of blue consists of its physical reality augmented by my
accompanying sensation of blueness.
IIQM. “The Ithaca Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics” — the constellation of ideas
put forth above, more accurately characterized as “An Ithaca Interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics”.
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